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Preface
Cooperative Stochastic Games in Stationary Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . 1–7
E.M. Baranova, L.A. Petrosyan
Abstract
The paper contributes to the theory of higher structures of strategic and coop-
erative games. The basic model of a stochastic game is represented by a graph tree
in which every vertex itself represents a game of strategy. Nevertheless, some forms
of cooperation or coordination of players’ behaviour are admissible. The transition
from one game to another in the stochastic structure is controlled by probabilities
depending on the situation in the input game. The interest is focused on station-
ary strategies in particular games, from the point of view of cooperative solutions,
namely the Shapley values. The main contribution of the paper consists in the
analysis of the model and of its elements, and the definition of subgame consis-
tent cooperative solution. The problem of subgame consistency is suggested to be
solved by adopting payoff distribution procedure. The theoretical construction is
illustrated by an example.
Algebraic Solutions for Matrix Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9–22
A.Bellieri, F.Fineschi, R.Giannetti
Abstract
An algorithm for solving a matrix game and obtaining the sets of optimal strate-
gies is produced. The algebraic solution of a 2 × 2 game is generalized to a m × n
game. The algorithm is actively engaged for some games with incomplete informa-
tion where the linear programming is not applicable.
Two Level Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23–32
E. Caprari, R. E. Lucchetti
Abstract
We consider games in which there are two types of players, the leaders and the
followers. We analyze some different models, according to the fact that players of the
same type act either non cooperatively or cooperatively, with the aim of providing
existence of a solution of the game.
Dynkin’s Stopping Games with Zero Payoffs for Separate Stopping 33–47
V. Domansky
Abstract
This paper deals with a stopping game (called Dynkin’s game) for a Markov chain
formulated by E. B. Dynkin (1969) with modification made by J. Neveu (1975). Two
players observe the Markov sequence xn, n=0,1,..., with the state space X and four
functions a11, a12, a21, c : X → R are given. Each player may stop the chain at
any stage n. When the chain is stopped the game is finished and Player 1 wins from
Player 2 a sum which depends on who is stopping the chain and on the current
state x of the Markov chain: a11(x) ∈ L if both stop simultaneously, a12(x) ∈ L
(resp. A21(x) ∈ L) if Player 1 (resp. Player 2) stops, where L is a class of functions
with bounded expectation along the Markov chain trajectory. The investigations in
the paper are confined to a subclass of Dynkin games with a12(x)=a21(x)=0 and
a11(x) and c(x) positive. It is shown that the value of such games is a non-negative
subharmonic function. The case of unbounded payoff a11(x) is also investigated.
Constructing Robust Control in
Game Problems with Linear Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49–66
S.A. Ganebny, S.S. Kumkov, V.S. Patsko
Abstract
In the paper, a conflict-controlled system with linear dynamics and fixed in-
stant of termination is considered. The useful control is assumed to be scalar and
bounded. A method for constructing nonlinear robust control is elaborated. The
robust control is built on the basis of special switching surface changing in time.
An Investment Allocation Game with a Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67–74
A. Garnaev, A. Solovyev
Abstract
In this paper we consider the investment allocation game where there is an initial
allocation of the resource from a third party. Nash equilibrium are derived. The
case of one and two firms game are investigated. Also the Stackelberg behaviour of
the players is considered.
An Optimal Insurance Policy in the Individual Risk Model Seen as a
Bargaining Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75–86
A. Y. Golubin
Abstract
The paper treats the problem of optimal risk exchange in the individual risk
model of insurance as a bargaining game, where the pay-offs are expected utilities
of the players. A characterization of the set of Pareto-optimal policies in the game is
given. It is shown that the set consists of policies of two kinds: deductible and upper
limit policies. The Nash’s and Kalai-Smorodinsky’s concepts for game solution are
applied to find the optimal policy in the model. On the basis of a numerical example,
these two solutions are compared.
On a Discrete Arbitration Procedure in Three Points . . . . . . . . . . 87–91
V.V. Mazalov, A.E. Mentcher and J.S. Tokareva
Abstract
We consider a non-cooperative zero-sum game related with a model of final-offer
arbitration procedure where two players L and M , interpreted here as Labour and
Management, respectively, have a dispute on an improvement in the wage rate. To
solve the conflict we use the so-called final-offer arbitration scheme developed by
Farber (1980).
Non-Hierarchical Signalling: Two-Stage Financing Game . . . . . . 93–110
A. Miglo, N. Zenkevich
Abstract
The literature analyzing games where some players have private information
about their ”types” is usually based on the duality of ”good” and ”bad” types (GB
approach), where ”good” type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this
paper analyzes a signalling game without types hierarchy. Different types have the
same average qualities but different profiles of quality over time which are their pri-
vate information. We apply this idea to analyze a financing-investment game where
firms’ insiders have private information about the firm’s profit profile over time.
Some firms are ”performance-improving” with increasing profit profiles; others are
”stagnant” with declining profit profiles. We show that equilibrium is either pool-
ing with debt when the economy is stagnating, or separating when the economy is
growing (performance-improving firms issue debt while stagnant firms issue shares).
This provides new theoretical results that cannot be explained by the standard GB
models and which are consistent with some financial market phenomena.
Players’ Information in Two-Player Games of ”Score Showdown” 111–124
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
There are some games widely played in the routine world of gambles, roulette,
quiz show and the sports excercises. The object of the game is to get the highest
score among all of the players in the game, from one or two chances of sampling.
The two-player sequential-move, imperfect-information games with the three kids
of score functions are investigated, and the optimal strategies for the two players
and the winning probabilities they can get in the optimal play are derived.
On Reduction of Alternative Pursuit Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125–137
I. Shevchenko
Abstract
A pursuit game is called alternative if it may be terminated on one of two given
terminal manifolds and two corresponding payoffs of Boltza type which differ only
in their terminal parts are associated with those variants. We investigate how to
reduce such a game to a set of interrelated ordinary pursuit games when solutions
of the games with fixed target alternatives are known. Assumed that the pursuer
selects an alternative as the target one only if a dominating condition is stable
along the corresponding optimal trajectory. At the part of playing space where the
dominating condition is unstable, an auxiliary game is to be set up.
We study in detail a case of convex differences of the values for fixed target al-
ternatives with a particular pattern of their behavior along the optimal trajectories.
Shown that the pursuer lowers the assured payoff at the states where no definitive
target alternative is to be selected.
The approach may be also used, for example, when a solution of an ordinary
differential game is being constructed with use of two families of characteristics of
the main equation.
Dynamic Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers and Technol-
ogy Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–161
L. Shravan
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show how the dynamics of the technology gap be-
tween firms helps demarcate the opposing effects of spillovers on R&D incentives. In
this study, we explore the theoretical link between spillovers and technology gap by
allowing the rate of spillovers to depend on the latter. In order to demonstrate the
relationship between technology gap and R&D incentives, we develop a two stage
game of process R&D and output competition for an ex-ante asymmetric duopoly
with one-way spillovers. Also the dynamic version of a two stage R&D game is
considered and three different (though non-mutually exclusive) sets of results are
presented. First, we present a variant of the static AJ model with one-way endoge-
nous spillovers. We show that the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) requires that the level of spillovers to be low and the initial marginal cost
to be high. We show that the relationship between the free-riding behavior of the
laggard and the level of spillovers is non-monotonic. We observe that they are
positively related as long as the size of spillovers is small. Secondly, we develop
a dynamic version of the latter model in a differential game setting. It is shown
that if each firm in the industry takes into account the dynamic strategic response
of its rival, results can be derived by looking at the transitional dynamics of the
firms reaction functions in the neighborhood of the steady state. Lastly, we provide
a general framework for analyzing dynamic AJ models with one-way endogenous
spillovers. We derive some general conditions that would guarantee the existence of
a steady state in a more general class of two stage R&D games with spillovers.
Mathematics of the JIPTO
and Theory of the Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163–171
G. Tomski
Abstract
In the paper the parlour game JIPTO (Jeux Intellectuels de Poursuite - Intellec-
tual Games of Pursuit) is formulated by using the mathematical tools of the theory
of pursuit games. Different modifications of JIPTO-games are classified and some
most used strategies of the pursuer are presented. The whole of the geometrical
proposals on the JIPTO and the other JIP presents an interesting extension of the
traditional geometry.
Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty
and Evaluation of American Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173–185
A.A. Vasin, V.V. Morozov
Abstract
This paper considers optimization problems related to investment decisions un-
der uncertainty. We examine a selection problem for portfolio of capital investment
opportunities. For every possible project, the investment is irreversible but can be
delayed. The precise solution is obtained in the case of deterministic projects with
zero volatilities. In general the problem is equivalent to evaluation of the American
call dual strike option without expiration date. Each stock is assumed dividend-
paying. In case of two projects with equal sunk costs we derive the upper bound of
the option price by means of it’s integral representation.
On a Continuous Dynamic Strategic Market Game . . . . . . . . . . . 187–195
P. Wie¸cek, T. Radzik
Abstract
We present a continuous model of dynamic strategic market game. We show that
for values of the discount factor not greater than 2/3 and every ε > 0 it possesses a
pure stationary ε-equilibrium and describe optimal strategies. In addition we show
that the game does not have a stationary equilibrium (0-equilibrium).
Proportional Values for TU Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197–206
E. Yanovskaya
Abstract
Proportional solutions for the class of positive TU games, which depend only on
the values of proportional excesses are defined. A list of properties of cooperative
game solutions which are applied for the characterization both of the least square
values and of the proportional values are given. A characterization of the logutili-
tarian proportional values and its comparison with the one of the least square values
are proposed.
The Crux of Dynamic Economic Cooperation Subgame Consistency
and Equilibrating Transitory Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207–221
D.W.K. Yeung, L.A. Petrosyan
Abstract
Dynamic economic cooperation represents one of the most complex forms of
decision-making analysis under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between
strategic behavior, dynamic evolution and stochastic elements have to be consid-
ered simultaneously in the process. This complexity leads to great difficulties in
the derivation of dynamically stable solutions. Despite urgent calls for cooperation
in the global economy, the lack of formal analysis solutions has precluded rigorous
analysis of this problem. In this paper, we examine two integral factors in con-
structing a solution for dynamic economic cooperation – subgame consistency and
equilibrating transitory compensation.
